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Patronage, Populism, and Protest:
Student Politics in Pakistani Punjab
Hassan Javid
1 On October 5, 2015, a small group of activists belonging to the left-wing Democratic
Students Alliance (DSA) gathered at the Liberty Market roundabout in Lahore to stage a
protest demanding an end to Pakistan’s ban on student unions. The ban, reintroduced
in  1993  by  the  Supreme  Court,  but  originally  imposed  in  1984  by  the  dictatorial
government  of  General  Zia-ul-Haq,  made  it  illegal  for  student  organizations  to  be
involved in, or connected to, mainstream electoral politics.1 Just over two years after
the DSA’s protest, clashes erupted in Punjab University between members of the Islami
Jamiat-i-Talaba (IJT), a right-wing Islamist student organization historically linked to
the Jamaat-i-Islami, and those of the Pashtun Students Union (PSU). The fighting on
January 21 2018, which involved dozens of students and left a good percentage of them
injured, was a repeat of an incident in March 2017 when similar clashes left 16 students
wounded. In news reports covering both incidents, the animosity between the IJT and
the PSU was attributed to conflicts over influence and turf, with the latter allegedly
striking back against the well-entrenched position of the former at Punjab University.
2 While the DSA, IJT, and PSU are all products of very different political circumstances
and alignments, what is interesting about the events listed above is the fact that these
organizations exist in the first place. Despite the ban, with its emphasis on ending the
involvement of university students in politics, student groups have continued to exist
and engage with each other, as well as with political parties. Moreover, while many of
the student organizations at the forefront of student activism in the 1960s, 1970s, and
1980s  have  gradually  faded  away  into  obscurity  and  irrelevance,2 they  have  been
replaced by new formations such as: the Insaf Students Federation (ISF), affiliated with
the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf  (PTI);  and the Pakistan Muslim League,  Nawaz’s  Youth
Wing  (henceforth  referred  to  as  PYW).  Both  organizations  explicitly  seek  to  bring
students and other young people into the fold of formal political parties. 
3 The existence and emergence of groups like the DSA, ISF, and PYW raises interesting
questions about the contemporary state of politics in Pakistan, and also problematizes
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a widespread view of  youth politics  that  suggests  that  the  bans  on student  unions
imposed in 1984 and 1993 has either facilitated the dominance of Islamist outfits like
the IJT (Nasr 1993; Nelson 2011) or has shaped a generation of students characterized
by political apathy and disinterest (Rehman and Naqvi 2013; Lall 2014). In addition to
explaining the genesis of these three student/youth organizations, this paper seeks to
examine the precise ways in which these groups engage with politics in the formally
democratic  dispensation that  has  existed in  Pakistan since 2008 while  arguing that
student politics in Punjab currently follows three different, but not mutually exclusive,
templates. Seen through this lens, the PYW epitomizes a model of patronage politics
geared towards augmenting young voter support through schemes and programs; the
ISF,  to  acquire  electoral  power,  mobilizes  around  populist  appeals  geared  towards
attracting  adherents  away  from  mainstream  parties;  and  the  DSA  utilizes  radical
ideological appeals to generate support to protest the political and economic status
quo. The paper traces how these three distinct organizational and activist strategies
emerge  from  the  interplay  between  the  structural  imperatives  and  individual
orientations defining student bodies within the framework of Pakistani politics. It also
examines the implications of student groups’ capacities for producing or reinforcing
particular patterns of political engagement. In particular, the paper suggests that the
mechanisms through which groups like the PYW and ISF have emerged reinforces the
depoliticization  of  Pakistan’s  students,  fostering  a  form  of  student  politics  that,
paradoxically,  functions  without  students.  In  shifting  the  focus  away  from  the
experiences of students themselves, and towards the institutional mechanisms through
which  they  have  been  co-opted  by  mainstream  political  actors,  this  paper  draws
attention to  how student  activism has  been contoured by  the  broader  context  and
political opportunity structure in Pakistan.
4 Throughout this paper, it is argued that the trajectory taken by mainstream student
politics in recent decades is one characterized by systematic “depoliticization.” What
this means is that in addition to being limited in terms of the types of organizations
they  can  participate  in,  students  in  Pakistan  have  increasingly  been  subjected  to
restrictions on the types of politics they can engage in and the range of issues around
which they can mobilize. Thus, for example, while students can form student societies
related to extracurricular activities, and sometimes use these for political discussions
and debate (a tactic used effectively by the DSA), they are not allowed to form student “
unions” and are often barred from hosting and even participating in events with an
overtly  political  focus.  Indeed,  as  is  clear  from  some  instances  described  below,
students and even faculty attempting to do so have been subject to censorship and even
harassment  by  the  state.  At  the  same  time,  particularly  since  the  1980s,  official
patronage extended to Islamist student organizations amidst a broader ban on student
politics, coupled with a narrative suggesting student politics is inherently violent and
dangerous, has meant that the space for mobilizing students has shrunk in ideological
and organizational terms. An entire generation of students has come of age without
exposure to the kind of politics that defined the student experience from the 1950s to
the 1970s. Indeed, when contemporary student politics in Pakistan is referred to as “
depoliticized,” it  is  in  contrast  with  an  earlier,  more  radical  tradition  of  political
engagement. As this paper argues, it is the erosion of this tradition that has created the
space  for  the  kind  of  top-down,  centralized,  and  non-ideological  forms  of  student
politics adopted by the mainstream parties.
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5 The paper’s focus on Punjab is rooted in how the province has borne witness to some of
the country’s most competitive electoral contests in recent years (particularly between
the PML-N and the PTI),  which have spilled over into the realm of student politics.
Punjab has also been the main region within which the DSA has operated since its
inception. However, the templates for student politics described in this paper arguably
have broader applicability in Pakistan; the “youth”/student wings of the PTI and PML-
N follow similar models of organization across the country and, as argued by this paper,
have emerged out of broader processes shaping the form and nature of student politics
in the country since the 1980s. Similarly, even the Pakistan People’s Party, aligned with
the once-powerful People’s Student Federation, has been subject to the same pressures
and constraints as  its  political  rivals  with comparable effects  on student politics  in
Sindh.  As  discussed  below,  however,  there  are  some  exceptions  to  this  general
tendency  towards  depoliticization  and  cooptation;  in  addition  to  the  DSA,  student
organizations built around ethnic identity (in, for example, Balochistan) and Islam are
arguably  oriented  around  more  explicitly  ideological  and  political  axes  than  their
mainstream. However, they remain relatively limited in their size and reach (with the
IJT being an exception to the rule) and are themselves products of broader political
circumstances informed by Pakistan’s history of ethnic and religious tensions. While
these  organizations  are  not  analyzed  in  any  detail  in  this  paper,  their  dynamics,
particularly  in  an  ostensibly  “democratic” Pakistan,  could  be  a  fruitful  subject  for
future research. 
6 The paper begins with a brief overview of the literature on, and history of, student
politics in Pakistan, emphasizing how the focus has tended to be on the ideological
clash between left and right-wing organizations, as well as associated ethnic groups,
during periods of authoritarian rule, with comparatively less attention being paid to
student  politics  within the  framework of  Pakistan’s  democratic  governance.  This  is
followed by accounts of each of the three student organizations covered in this paper—
the PYW, the ISF, and the DSA—illustrating the differences between them as well as the
varying roles they play as vehicles for the recruitment and mobilization of voters, the
articulation of issues and grievances, and networks for the acquisition and dispensation
of patronage. The paper then concludes with some reflections on the future of student
politics  in Pakistan,  particularly considering the creeping authoritarianism that has
arguably characterized the country’s politics in recent years.
 
A Brief History of Student Politics in Pakistan
7 The earliest accounts of student participation in Pakistan’s politics generally tend to
focus on the role played by the Muslim Students Federation in the years leading up to
partition and independence in 1947. Formed in 1937 as a part of the All India Muslim
League, the MSF played a key role in the League’s attempts to generate and mobilize
support for the idea of Pakistan in the cities of Punjab (Mirza 1991). However, soon
after  independence,  the  MSF’s  position  as  the  primary  organization  representing
student interests in Pakistan was challenged by the emergence of rival groups on both
the left and the right; the IJT was formed in 1947 as an affiliate of the Jamaat-i-Islami,
the Democratic Students Federation (DSF) was created to be the student wing of the
Communist Party of Pakistan in 1950, and the National Student Federation emerged as
a  left-wing  union  backed  by  the  National  Awami  Party  and  other  leftist  forces.  In
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addition  to  these  groups,  student  organizations  based  in  East  Pakistan  (now
Bangladesh) also emerged including the East Pakistan Students’ League (affiliated with
the Awami League), the East Pakistan Students Union (linked to the East Pakistan wing
of the National Awami Party), and the Islami Chattra Sangha (part of the East Pakistan
Jamaat-i-Islami).  Finally,  the  first  two  decades  after  independence  also  saw  the
emergence of explicitly ethnic student organizations such as the Pakhtoon Students
Federation  and  the  Baloch  Students  Organization.  According  to  at  least  one
contemporary  account,  85  percent  of  student  respondents  in  East  Pakistan  and  68
percent in West Pakistan were members of at least one of the organizations listed above
(Maniruzzaman 1971a). 
8 The multiplication of student organizations in the immediate aftermath of partition
was  arguably  a  direct  result  of  the  fragmentation  of  Pakistan’s  broader  political
landscape  after  independence.  As  has  been  documented  at  length  by  Toor (2011),
Malik (2013b),  Raza (2013),  and Ali (2013),  the  first  decade of  Pakistan’s  history  was
characterized in no small part by attempts by left-wing political forces to assert greater
influence  in  the  politics  of  the  country,  an  effort  that  was  ultimately  met  with
considerable opposition from the state leading to, but not ending with, the banning of
the Communist Party of Pakistan in 1954. Early on, the imperatives of Cold War politics
led the Pakistani establishment to align itself  quite firmly with the anti-Communist
bloc  headed  by  the  United  States  (Jalal 1989),  creating  a  cleavage  between  anti-
communist elites in the state and left-wing challengers in society that spilled over into
student politics. This left-right divide was also supplemented by political differences
over  the  role  of  religion  in  Pakistan’s  politics  and public  discourse,  with  explicitly
religious  groups  like  the  IJT  coming  into  conflict  with  their  secular  opponents,
generating antagonisms that would continue to shape student politics in the decades to
come.
9 In addition to the Left-Right cleavage that pit some student unions against the state,
Pakistan’s  fractious  ethnic  politics  also  fed  into  the  broader  politicization  of  the
country’s students. East Pakistani university students who were at the forefront of calls
for greater ethnic and provincial recognition and autonomy, as evinced by the clashes
that erupted in 1952 at Dhaka University over the non-adoption of Bengali as a national
language in Pakistan, were the forerunners of ethnicity-based student mobilizations in
West  Pakistan  that  sought  to  challenge  the  hegemony  exerted  by  Punjab  over  the
country’s  politics  (Samad 1998;  Hussain 2012).  The  Pakhtoon  and  Baloch  student
organizations that emerged in this period were linked to the nascent ethno-national
movements that had begun to emerge in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa and
Balochistan  and  were  joined  by  groups  like  the  Jeay  Sindh  Students  Federation  in
Sindh.  Like  contemporary  left-wing  student  groups,  with  which  they  shared  some
ideological  affinities,  these  student  organizations  also found  themselves  at  the
receiving end of state repression aimed at preserving the political status quo.
10 Student politics  in Pakistan’s  early years was thus characterized by ideological  and
ethnic cleavages that set groups against each other and, in some instances, against the
state. Matters came to a head during the military government of General Ayub Khan,
when Pakistan’s disparate student organizations came together to participate in the
movement  that  would  eventually  topple  the  regime  in  1969.  Despite  systematic
attempts by the regime and its predecessors to suppress left-wing political forces in
Pakistan, the continued existence of such groups in both the Eastern and Western parts
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of Pakistan, buttressed by informal networks of cooperation and collaboration, meant
that workers and students were able to marshal the resources required to effectively
oppose the Ayub Khan government in the late 1960s (Malik 2013a). More specifically,
left-wing and ethnic student groups antagonized by the repressive measures taken by
the regime, including attempts to ban student politics when Ayub Khan first came to
power,  were  joined  in  opposition  to  the  regime  by  organizations  that  might  have
otherwise been expected to support it, with the MSF and IJT both throwing their weight
behind the anti-Ayub movement (Ali 1970; Maniruzzaman 1971b; Sayeed 1979).3 
11 The collapse of the Ayub regime was quickly followed by the secession of East Pakistan
and the creation of Bangladesh, an event that severed the ties that had existed between
the student organizations of both countries. In West Pakistan, the elections of 1970 had
brought the Pakistan People’s Party to power with its charismatic leader, Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, riding the wave of popular discontent against Ayub Khan to garner electoral
support  on  an  avowedly  left-wing  platform  that  built  on  the  achievements  of  the
various worker and student groups that had been instrumental to the success of the
anti-Ayub movement (Jones 2003). Soon after coming to power, however, the new PPP
government essentially turned its back on many of its erstwhile allies and supporters,
engaging in a crackdown on left-wing workers and students’ groups that opposed it
over its alleged lack of commitment to radical reform (Ali 2005; Malik 2018). The PPP
government’s opposition to these groups was shaped by its broader political struggles,
particularly against the National Awami Party and its affiliated organizations, as well as
the Jamaat-i-Islami and factions of the Muslim League. The repression of alternative
left-wing forces by the PPP government allowed it to claim the mantle of the Left in
Pakistan even as the party itself drifted increasingly to the right (Akhtar 2010), and its
own student organization, the Peoples’ Student Federation, emerged as a competitor
for the political space occupied by rival left-wing unions (Paracha 2009).
12 The toppling of the first PPP government by a military coup launched by General Zia-
ul-Haq in 1977 once again altered the topography of student politics in Pakistan. Zia’s
regime enjoyed the support of the right-wing parties and student organizations that
had underpinned the Pakistan National  Alliance (PNA) which had come together to
oppose  the  PPP in  the  1970s  and was  aligned firmly  with  the  IJT  and the  MSF.  In
addition  to  this,  1978  also  saw  the  birth  of  the  All  Pakistan  Mohajir  Students
Organization  (APMSO),  an  entity  that  explicitly  sought  to  represent  Urdu-speaking
migrants living in Sindh’s major cities, and which would later give birth to the MQM.
While the APMSO was, at least initially, suspected of being an organization propped up
by the Zia regime to counter the influence of the PPP in Sindh, by 1981 the vagaries of
local  government  and  campus  politics  led  the  APMSO to  join  the  United  Students’
Movement, a collection of left-wing and ethnic student organizations opposed to the
Islamizing and authoritarian tendencies of the Zia regime and its allies. 
13 In  subsequent  years,  the  enduring  power  of  the  existing  student  groups  was
demonstrated when anti-Zia groups like the PSF swept student union elections held in
universities in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At the same time, increasing repression
by the Zia regime and the violent on-campus activities of the IJT led to the an increase
in  the  frequency  of  armed clashes  between rival  student  groups,  a  situation  made
worse by the influx of weapons from the war raging in Afghanistan which, when in the
hands of student unions, resulted in unprecedented levels of death and injury. It was
the  combination  of  these  two  factors—the  enduring  appeal  of  anti-regime  student
Patronage, Populism, and Protest: Student Politics in Pakistani Punjab
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 22 | 2019
5
groups and the weaponization of student politics—that arguably provided the pretext
for  the  ban  on  student  politics  imposed  by  General  Zia-ul-Haq  in  1984  (Butt  2009;
Paracha 2009). While the IJT was largely able to evade the effects of this ban, mainly
due  to  the  continued cooperation  between the  Jamaat-i-Islami  and the  Zia  regime,
other student groups were increasingly forced underground; while they still existed on
campuses  across  the  country,  elections  that  they  held  were  deemed  void,  their
activities  were  closely  regulated  and suppressed,  and the  rambunctious  democratic
politics that had characterized student organizations in the 1960s and the 1970s was
brought to an end.
14 When the government of Zia-ul-Haq finally collapsed in 1988, once more bringing the
PPP to power, the ban that had been imposed on student politics was lifted. Subsequent
union elections across Pakistan saw the IJT defeated by the PSF, the MSF, and other
progressive groups, setting the stage for the revival of the kind of student politics that
had  characterized  the  pre-Zia  years.  However,  in  addition  to  generating  clashes
between groups like the PSF and APMSO which sought to fill the vacuum left by the IJT,
the dismissal of the PPP government in 1990 and its replacement by one headed by the
Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), a collection of conservative and religious parties set up
during the Zia years and opposed to the PPP, saw the re-emergence of the campus
clashes that had provided the pretext for banning student unions in 1984. Once again,
the enduring popularity of the PSF and its allied groups, coupled with a split in the IJI
that led to the IJT vying with the MSF for control in Punjab’s campuses, led to violent
clashes that prompted the government of Nawaz Sharif to approach the Supreme Court
in 1991 to uphold the ban on unions that had been imposed by General Zia-ul-Haq. The
Supreme Court did so in early 1993 just months before Nawaz Sharif’s government was
itself  dismissed by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan (Paracha 2009).  For the rest of the
1990s, student politics remained largely informal; while the IJT was able to reassert
itself on campuses throughout the country in a way not dissimilar to how it operated
during the years of the Zia regime’s ban on student politics, groups like the MSF and
the PSF also continued to operate, albeit with dwindling influence and support. 
15 By the  time Pakistan experienced its  third  military  coup in  1999,  bringing General
Pervez Musharraf to power, the student politics of past decades had mostly come to an
end. While the PSF and MSF existed on paper (with the latter now aligning itself with
the  PML-Q,  a  breakaway  faction  of  the  PML-N  allied  with  the  new  regime),  these
organizations  no  longer  had  the  presence  on  campus  or  the  resources  needed  to
continue  operating  as  viable  political  entities.  Progressive  groups  like  the  NSF
disappeared  from  the  radar  altogether  whereas  ethnic  organizations  like  the  BSO
continued to operate in their relatively small provincial enclaves, often at the receiving
end of broader state repression aimed at suppressing ethno-national sentiment. The IJT
maintained  a  presence  in  universities  and  colleges,  particularly  in  Punjab,  but
increasingly directed its energies towards regulating students on campus rather than
engaging  in  mainstream  politics.  For  Paracha (2009)  and  Nelson (2011),  this  apathy
could be explained by two significant factors. First, the birth of the Musharraf regime
coincided with the coming-of-age of an entire generation of students that had grown
up under the shadow of the ban on student politics imposed by General Zia-ul-Haq, the
effect  of  which was multiplied by the not  entirely  unwarranted belief  that  student
politics in the 1980s and 1990s had been reduced to little more than violent clashes
between  unsavory  elements  acting  as  extensions  of  national  level  political  parties.
Second,  the  moribund  nature  of  student  politics  created  space  for  alternative
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organizations,  such  as  more  radical  national  and  transnational  Islamist  outfits
tolerated and even nurtured by the state, to attract students interested in engaging in
politics 
16 It was therefore surprising when the anti-Musharraf movement of 2007, triggered by a
judicial crisis that erupted after Musharraf’s arbitrary and unlawful dismissal of the
country’s Chief Justice, saw the participation, albeit in limited numbers, of students
affiliated  with  elite,  private  universities  like  the  Lahore  University  of  Management
Sciences (LUMS), Beaconhouse National University (BNU), and the National University
of  Computer  and  Engineering  Sciences  (commonly  known  as  FAST).  As  argued  by
Bolognani (2011), Talib (2011) and Kalra (2018), the participation of students from these
universities,  and LUMS in particular,  was prompted by a combination of  factors;  in
addition  to  possessing  relatively  high  levels  of  privilege,  derived  from  their
socioeconomic  status  which  insulated  them  from  some  of  the  dangers  involved  in
taking on the state, they also benefitted from the presence of faculty and individual
students  ideologically  committed  to  opposing  authoritarian  rule.  Furthermore,  the
changing media landscape in Pakistan and, indeed, the world, facilitated their protest
activities; not only could they access information about the anti-Musharraf campaign
from an increasingly globalized media, these students were also able to use the internet
and nascent forms of social media to organize, disseminate information, and garner
support  for  their  cause  (Bolognani 2010;  Talib 2011;  Zia 2012).  At  the  same  time,
following a confrontation with IJT activists during a visit to Punjab University to rally
support  for  the  anti-Musharraf  movement,  Imran  Khan,  the  leader  of  the  PTI,
established  the  Insaf  Students  Federation (ISF)  on  November  14,  2007  as  a  means
through which to mobilize students against the regime, but also in support of the PTI
and its quest for political power.
17 When the PPP returned to government in 2008 following elections held after the fall of
the Musharraf regime, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani promised to end the decades-
long ban on student unions that had crippled student politics in Pakistan. However, no
action was taken in this regard by the PPP or the PML-N government that succeeded it
in 2013. While the Senate of Pakistan did pass a resolution calling for student unions to
be revived in  2017,  the  ban on student  politics  remains  in  place.  Yet,  despite  this,
groups like the ISF and IJT continue to operate on campuses, even as older student
organizations like the PSF and the MSF have struggled to emerge from obscurity.
 
Democracy, Electoral Politics, and Student
Organizations in Pakistan
18 Matthew Nelson (2011) suggests that the tendency to view student politics in Pakistan
in terms of national, territorially defined ideological, sectarian, and ethnic cleavages
obscures how, since the 1990s, the decline of traditional student unions has led many
young people to join and support  transnational  organizations,  primarily  Islamist  in
nature,  that  offer  a  political  vision  transcending  the  largely  static  politics  of  local
organizations. While this highlights an important dimension of contemporary student
engagement  with  politics  in  Pakistan,  little  has  been said  about  how the  country’s
transition to democracy in 2008 has affected student organizations. Indeed, as argued
by Javid (2019), Pakistan’s decade of democracy has borne witness to attempts by the
mainstream parties in power at the Federal and Provincial  levels,  most notably the
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PML-N  in  Punjab,  to  consolidate  their  position  through  legislative  and  executive
interventions  aimed  at  strengthening  their  ability  to  control  electoral  candidates,
politicians, local vote blocs, and bureaucrats, through the provision of patronage. These
efforts have revolved around altering the rules of political competition by ensuring
ruling parties monopolize the levers of state patronage and bureaucratic appointment,
thereby  skewing  the  electoral  landscape  in  their  favor  and  making  it  harder  for
political rivals to offer credible alternatives to the political status quo.4 In this context,
it  stands  to  reason  that  the  student  and  youth  organizations  affiliated  with  these
parties,  and operating  across  the  country  despite  the  continuing  ban on student  “
politics,” feed into these attempts to alter the broader political landscape.5 
19 Concurrently,  to  the  extent  that  current  student  bodies  affiliated  with  mainstream
parties  represent  little  more  than  extensions  of  their  parent  organizations  in
ideological and electoral terms, thereby narrowing their scope for engagement with
the larger political questions that characterize contemporary Pakistan, it is important
to ask how students organizing outside of these constraints operate in an environment
where  formal  “political” activity  remains  banned,  popular  participation  in  student
organizations remains limited, and official state policy continues to form the basis for
crackdowns and repression directed at forces seeking to campaign on issues related to
social  and  economic  justice,  minority  rights,  and  provincial  autonomy.  This  is
particularly true for left-wing groups attempting to recover from decades of opposition
from the state, and the decimation of traditional left-wing organizations like the NSF
and DSF that have all but disappeared from mainstream politics. As the following case
studies show, focusing on the PLW, the ISF, and the DSA, the imperatives of electoral
competition, the appeal of populist mobilization, and the impetus for radical change,
all converge to produce different trajectories of political participation by students in a
democratizing Pakistan.
 
The PML-N Youth Wing: Patronage in Place of Politics
20 When General Musharraf removed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif from power in 1999
and subsequently exiled him and other top leaders of the PML-N to Saudi Arabia, the
effect on the party was immediate and devastating; within months, politicians from the
PML-N  voiced  their  support  for  the  new  military  regime.  This  culminated  in  the
formation  of  the  PML-Q,  a  pro-Musharraf  political  party;  described  by  one
commentator as “less an organized political force than a collection of opportunists”
(Shah 2003:35), it would go on to win the general elections of 2002. The MSF, which had
remained aligned with the PML-N throughout the 1990s and had attempted to maintain
a presence on college campuses despite the ban on student unions, also switched its
allegiance,  formally  linking  itself  to  the  new  party  in  power.  While  this  new
partnership might have represented a significant political realignment in the heady
days of the 1960s or the 1970s, the stagnant student politics of the Musharraf era meant
that the MSF remained a marginal force, sinking further into irrelevancy.
21 Nawaz Sharif’s return to Pakistan after the end of the Musharraf government, and his
party’s subsequent rise to power in Punjab in 2008 (and, later, its victory in the 2013
general elections) saw the MSF return to the PML-N’s political fold. While this shift
prompted at least one exchange of hostilities between different factions of the MSF in
Lahore’s  M.A.O  College  on  April  28  2008,  matters  were  quickly  settled  as  the
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organization settled into a now familiar routine; office bearers were elected, regional
chapters were created, and the MSF could be relied upon to provide the PML-N with a
small supply of students and other young people to attend rallies and vote as and when
required. Again, the absence of any active student politics on university campuses, in
terms  of  elections  or  campaigns,  and  the  more  generalized  disenchantment
characterizing student politics, meant that the MSF, as an organization built around
student engagement, could only play an extremely limited role in the wider politics of
the PML-N. Indeed, the frustrations felt by the MSF were perhaps best articulated by its
Chief Organizer Sardar Mohsin Abbasi in December 2017 when he lashed out against
the party leadership for not granting the MSF any representation whatsoever in the
PML-N’s decision-making bodies. 
22 However,  soon  after  coming  to  power,  the  PML-N  began  to  pursue  an  alternative
strategy for engaging with young people and students, eschewing the use of the MSF
and similar  organizations in  favor  of  a  more centralized approach,  directed by the
party leadership, aimed at directly cultivating the support of these groups through the
provision of patronage and the articulation of policies aimed at capturing the attention
and, more importantly, votes of this constituency. In 2011, Capt. Muhammad Safdar
Awan, Nawaz Sharif’s son-in-law, was appointed the head of the PML-N Youth Wing and
was tasked with organizing and mobilizing the party’s young supporters, performing a
task that, in previous years, would have been performed by the MSF. Yet, unlike the
MSF,  the  PYW did  not  attempt  to  establish  itself  in  universities  and  on  campuses.
Instead, it became a platform through which the party articulated policies aimed at
highlighting the PML-N’s commitment to improving the lives of Pakistan’s “youth”—a
putatively  undifferentiated  mass  of  young  people—as  well  as  directly  recruiting
members through meetings, rallies, and social media. 
23 In  choosing to  attract  younger voters  through the PYW and its  patronage-oriented
approach to cultivating support, the PML-N was arguably replicating the same model of
centralized  patronage disbursement  it  employed  to  cement  its  control  over  the
bureaucracy and local government in Punjab (Javid 2019). However, the decision not to
revive the MSF on campuses was also borne out of the PML-N’s experiences during the
early 1990s and later during the Musharraf years; clashes between rival factions of the
MSF and other student organizations had, after all, prompted Nawaz Sharif to approach
the Supreme Court to reintroduce the Zia-era ban in student politics in 1993. Similarly,
the MSF’s defection to the PML-Q during the Musharraf regime served as a reminder
that the PML-N’s party apparatus could be subverted and used against it by rivals in
adverse political circumstances. These factors, coupled with the MSF’s organizational
decline,  prompted the PML-N to pursue an alternative model  of  student and youth
engagement  that  promised  to  cultivate  support  without  having  to  cede  any
organizational control or autonomy.
24 The main thrust of the PML-N’s attempts to attract young people revolved around the
initiation  of  various  schemes  that  aimed  to  deliver  patronage  to  potential  voters,
offering them goods and services in exchange for political support. For example, one of
the flagship schemes launched by the PML-N towards this end was a program, launched
in 2012, that was slated to provide over 100000 free laptops to underprivileged students
across  Punjab  at  a  cost  of  Rs.  4  billion,  all  of  which  came  packaged  in  backpacks
proclaiming their provenance as gifts from Shahbaz Sharif, the Chief Minister of the
province. A related policy, launched by the Punjab government in 2012, saw Rs. 1.5
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billion being allocated to provide internships to 50000 students in the province, some of
whom were encouraged to take up positions in the Chief Minister’s Secretariat. At the
same time, the Punjab government also pledged Rs. 3 billion for the provision of loans
to underprivileged students. The following year, after winning the general elections of
2013, the PML-N continued its tendency to concentrate power in the hands of the Sharif
family  and its  closest  political  allies,  with  Nawaz  Sharif’s  daughter  Maryam Nawaz
being appointed the head of the Prime Minister’s Youth Program, directing a range of
different schemes aimed at providing young people loans, skills training, and tuition
waivers. These schemes and others continued for the duration of the PML-N’s tenure
and were constantly used by the party as a basis upon which to campaign for young
voters.
25 At some level, as admitted in a 2011 interview by PML-N leader and minister Ahsan
Iqbal, the PML-N’s shift to this model of campaigning was based on a recognition of
how, since 2007, the PML-N’s relative indifference to students had allowed the PTI and
the ISF, with their dynamic message of change and empowerment, to attract younger
voters who might have otherwise been sympathetic to the PML-N. By 2018, on the eve
of the general  elections held that year,  the PML-N’s prime minister Shahid Khaqan
Abbasi claimed that 1.1 million people had been beneficiaries of the various youth-
oriented  programs launched  by  his  party,  representing  billions  of  rupees  worth  of
spending invested in cultivating youth support. While there is currently insufficient
data to indicate the extent to which this model was able to generate youth enthusiasm
for the PML-N at the ballot box, the party’s entire approach to student politics over the
past decade is one that runs entirely contrary to Pakistan’s earlier experiences in this
area. More importantly, it represents an alternate mode of political engagement, with a
well-entrenched, dynastic, and clientelistic political party foregoing often messy and
difficult engagement with campus politics in favor of using the levers of state power to
cultivate potential voters in a broader political atmosphere characterized by apolitical
apathy and ideological emptiness.
 
The Insaf Students Federation: From Populism to
Power
26 When Imran Khan first launched the ISF in November 2007, it was largely in response
to the hostile  reception he received at  Punjab University  when he visited its  main
campus  in  Lahore  at  the  height  of  the  anti-Musharraf  protests.  Then,  the  ISF  was
largely  envisaged  as  a  campus-based  alternative  to  groups  like  the  IJT  which  had
managed to flourish in Punjab despite the formal ban on student politics. However, like
the PTI itself, the ISF remained a marginal force in Pakistani politics for several years
until enthusiasm and support for the party erupted in the wake of a successful rally in
Lahore, held on October 30 2011, which was attended by an estimated 100000 people.
That the PTI could stage such a large and successful rally in Lahore, considered the
main stronghold of the PML-N, was taken as evidence of the party’s potential as a major
political player, and marked the beginning of a political movement that eventually saw
the PTI win the general elections of 2018.
27 From the very beginning, but especially after the 2011 Lahore rally, Imran Khan and
the PTI’s appeal lay in their constant use of populist rhetoric, calling for radical change
to a corrupt status quo characterized by poor governance and instability.6 Vowing that
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his  party  would  wash  over  this  system  like  a  “tsunami,” Imran  Khan  relentlessly
campaigned on an anti-corruption agenda that targeted the PPP,  PML-N, and other
mainstream parties, blaming them for Pakistan’s past and present travails. Over time,
the PTI was able to attract heavyweight politicians who defected from rival parties.
While  older  party  workers  and  Imran  Khan  himself  initially  resisted  the  need  to
accommodate such candidates, the party’s underwhelming performance in 2013 (given
the expectations it had created for itself) led to a reconfiguration of its strategy that
saw it make judicious use of traditional constituency politicians to win power in 2018.
While there have always been rumors, sometimes endorsed by leading politicians like
Javed Hashmi who left the PML-N for the PTI only to leave it too in 2014, suggesting
that  the  PTI  benefitted  from  the  support  of  a  military  establishment  increasingly
committed to removing the PML-N from power,7 the enthusiasm generated by the PTI,
particularly among young voters, was undeniable. Indeed, polling data from the 2013
elections showed that the PTI was able to capture almost 30% of the youth vote, an
impressive performance given that the party was a relatively new entrant to electoral
politics (Siddiqui 2014).
28 The PTI’s success with young voters and students could arguably be attributed to its
commitment to directly engaging with them. From its very inception, the ISF actively
sought to recruit members from all of Pakistan’s provinces, and the party was arguably
the first in Pakistan to recognize the tremendous potential  of social  media,  making
effective use of Facebook and Twitter to promote debate and discussion amongst the
students and other young people joining the PTI. The PTI’s efforts to capture the youth
vote were perhaps encapsulated by the party’s stated policy prior to the 2013 elections,
of fielding only fresh, new faces under the age of 40 for provincial assembly seats in all
of Pakistan’s provinces. The party remained true to this promise and while many of the
resulting nominees were members of existing political families, the efforts made by the
PTI to actively promote the voices of students and young people within its internal
power  structure  arguably  generated  a  sense  of  ownership  and  participation  that
explained the appeal it had for these groups (Siddiqui 2014; Lall 2014). 
29 The PTI’s  combination of  anti-corruption rhetoric,  apparent commitment to radical
change,  and  active  engagement  with  the  youth  was  supplemented  by  a  constant,
visible, and sometimes even festive form of political contestation through mass rallies,
demonstrations, and sit-ins directed against the PPP and the PML-N. In early 2013, hot
on  the  heels  of  successful  rallies  in  all  of  Pakistan’s  major  cities  in  which  tens  of
thousands of  attendees,  many of  whom were young,  listened to  speeches by Imran
Khan and danced to campaign songs written by famous pop artists, the PTI joined a sit-
in in Islamabad launched by the Pakistan Awami Tehreek which sought to force the
resignation of the PPP government that was then in power. While this sit-in failed to
achieve its objectives, it set the template for a months-long effort in 2014 when the PTI,
protesting alleged rigging in 2013, planted thousands of its members in the heart of
Islamabad to demand an investigation in the election. Night after night, Imran Khan
and other PTI leaders made thunderous speeches castigating their political opponents
while promising to create a “naya” (new) Pakistan should they be elected to power.
These  sit-ins  were  enthusiastically  attended by  PTI  members  from across  Pakistan,
were subjected to non-stop coverage in the media,  and provided fodder for endless
debates and discussions amongst Pakistan’s predominantly young consumers of social
media. This model of campaigning also worked to great effect in 2017, on the eve of the
2018 elections, when allegations of corruption led to the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif as
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prime minister following a Supreme Court decision, relentlessly demanded by Imran
Khan, which barred Sharif from holding public office.
30 However, while the past decade has shown the existence of considerable support and
enthusiasm  for  the  PTI  amongst  young  voters,  the  party’s  contradictions  have
increasingly come to the fore. Indeed, prior to the 2013 elections, the PTI’s reliance on
rallies and rhetoric to mobilize support arguably came at the expense of an investment
in the party’s organizational apparatus. This was demonstrated by the failure of the
Tabdeeli  Razakar  (Agents  of  Change)  program;  initially  conceived  of  as  a  platform
through which younger voters supportive of the PTI could volunteer to campaign for
the  party’s  candidates  in  constituencies  across  the  country,  the  plan  ultimately
foundered due to a lack of planning. According to one senior PTI leader who would
later go on to hold a cabinet position after the party came to power in 2018, the party
initially believed that the enthusiasm displayed for the PTI by younger voters would
mean that hundreds if not thousands of volunteers would be willing to work for the
party’s election campaign in 2013. Yet, even though recruitment of Tabdeeli Razakars
began in September 2012, the party’s failure to effectively train them or incorporate
them  within  the  party’s  structure  meant  that  this  potential  resource  remained
unutilized. The program itself died out after the 2013 elections.
31 More  damaging  than  the  party’s  lack  of  planning,  however,  has  been  the  PTI’s
transformation into an entity emulating and ultimately reproducing status quo politics
in Pakistan. As a party campaigning on a platform of change, it is paradoxical that it
has had to rely on traditional  patrons and brokers to consolidate vote blocs across
Punjab and Pakistan; just as its legislative record in in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, where it
won power in 2013, demonstrated a tendency towards centralization and the use of
patronage to secure power that is not too dissimilar to the methods employed by the
PML-N in Punjab. More significantly, as evinced by conflicts within the party between
its so-called “ideological” wing comprised of old party workers and newer inductees
belonging  to  the  traditional  political  class,  the  relatively  open  and  inclusive  party
structure that facilitated the participation of students and other fresh faces has slowly
been  replaced  by  a  sclerotic  party  apparatus  dominated  by  a  few  heavyweight
politicians.8 Indeed,  many  of  the  pledges  made  by  the  PTI  in  2013,  such  as  its
commitment to fielding young, new candidates in elections, were conspicuous by their
absence in 2018 and while the party’s presence on social media remains impressive, it
has  gradually  lost  some  ground  to  its  increasingly  web-savvy  political  opponents.
Perhaps  most  importantly  of  all,  in-fighting  over  internal  party  elections  and  the
selection of electoral  candidates has shown that the ISF,  like the MSF, PSF,  and IJT
before it, has become little more than a mechanism through which aspirants to public
office make use of  connections with the established political  elite  to  secure power.
While there may have been considerable energy propelling the PTI to power, coming in
no small part from the enthusiasm of young supporters, it remains to be seen if the
logic of electoral politics will allow the PTI to contrast itself with its rivals in the years
to come.
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The Democratic Students Alliance: Radicalism without
Representation
32 The decline of student politics ushered in by the ban imposed by General Zia-ul-Haq
was accompanied by the spread of more conservative, Islamist ideologies on campuses
around  the  country.  This  was  an  effect  of  the  continued  presence  of  the  IJT  in
universities,  the dwindling influence of alternative,  secular forces,  and official  state
policy  that  encouraged the Islamization of  life  in  Pakistan (Toor 2011).  Indeed,  one
influential  account  of  student  attitudes  and opinions  in  Pakistan,  based on surveys
conducted  on  university  campuses  in  2010,  suggested  that  even  relatively  well-
educated,  middle  class  students  were  largely  conservative  and  susceptible  to
radicalization by Islamist forces (Siddiqa 2010). While there are and were outliers to
this general trend, such as the National College of Arts in Lahore which has long been
known for possessing a relatively tolerant, diverse, and liberal campus environment,
enclaves such as this have arguably only been able to survive due to concerted attempts
by students, faculty, and administrators to actively prevent organizations like the IJT
from developing a presence on campus.  More importantly,  for all  its  pluralism, the
National  College  of  Arts  has  hardly  ever  been  a  hotbed  of  student  radicalism,  its
resident artists and musicians remaining largely disconnected from broader political
struggles (Sankara 2010).
33 Nonetheless, despite this apparent decline in support for left-wing political ideologies
amongst university students, one of the more interesting developments to emerge from
the  anti-Musharraf  movement  was  the  creation  of  small  student  groups,  primarily
organized  on  the  campuses  of  elite  universities  like  LUMS,  that  actively  sought  to
nurture the tradition of progressive and democratic politics that re-emerged in that
period.  The  activities  of  these  disparate  and  often  unconnected  groups  led  to  the
creation of the Democratic Students Alliance in 2012, a loose collection of avowedly
left-wing students that grew out of largely failed attempts to revive the NSF. With an
explicit  commitment  to  secularism,  economic  and  social  justice,  and  democratic
politics,  the  DSA  worked  to  expand  its  networks,  with  groups  at  LUMS  and  BNU,
comprised of both students and faculty, reaching out to, and engaging with, potentially
likeminded students in public sector universities like Lahore’s Government College, the
University of Engineering and Technology (UET), and Punjab University. In early 2018,
the  Progressive  Students  Collective  (PSC)  was  created  as  a  parallel  organization
affiliated with the DSA; while the latter continued with its focus on issues of broader
political concern, the PSC was set up to focus on questions related to campus life and
the welfare of university and college students.
34 What distinguishes the DSA and the PSC from other organizations like the ISF is a lack
of political patrons. This is partly an effect of the wider malaise of the Left in Pakistan,
whereby the number and influence of left-wing political parties remains limited. Thus,
while the DSA has often worked in collaboration with parties like the Awami Workers
Party  (AWP),  one  of  the  larger  leftist  parties  currently  operating  in  Pakistan,  its
political  work  remains  distinct  and  autonomous,  wholly  directed  by  students
themselves  working  with  mentors  from  their  faculties.9 While  this  has  placed
limitations on the ability of the DSA to engage in political work on the scale of its more
well-resourced  and  politically  connected  rivals,  freedom  from  the  ideological  and
practical constraints imposed by the logic of electoral politics has allowed the DSA to
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mobilize around issues that might otherwise be ignored by mainstream politics, also
facilitating  gradual  growth  of  a  grass-roots  activism  steeped  in  an  ideological
commitment to progressive causes.
35 Like  its  contemporaries,  the  DSA  makes  extensive  use  of  social  media  to  facilitate
debate, discussion, and organization, but also supplements this with regular meetings,
study circles, and events aimed at generating interest in the campaigns it works on.
Over the course of  the past  half-decade,  activists  affiliated with the DSA have held
protests against religious extremism on and off campus, have joined forces with the
AWP to campaign for the rights of the residents of squatter settlements in Islamabad,
have  worked  to  ensure  fair  wages  for  janitorial  staff  on  campuses,  have  rallied  in
support of the rights of women and religious minorities, and have also protested the
abduction of  journalists  and other dissidents who routinely go missing in Pakistan.
Often, the DSA’s support for these causes runs entirely contrary to the narratives and
agendas  of  the  state  and mainstream political  parties,  with  the  latter  in  particular
choosing  to  avoid  engaging  with  issues  that  could  potentially  be  contentious  and
controversial. 
36 Although the DSA represents an important voice in Pakistan’s student politics, carrying
the mantle of a progressive tradition that has all but disappeared from the country’s
campuses,  its  radical  orientation and concurrent lack of  engagement with electoral
politics imposes inevitable limits on its power to act as a vehicle for change. While its
entire model of student engagement rests on the careful and principled inculcation of
progressive values amongst its adherents, with a view towards eventually generating or
feeding into the mass movements of the future, it remains a relatively marginal and
fragile force in contemporary Pakistani politics.10
 
Reflections on the Future of Student Politics in
Pakistan 
37 One  of  the  more  striking  observations  that  can  be  made  about  student  politics  in
present-day Pakistan is the apparent absence of the kinds of ideological divides that
pitted organizations like the NSF, the MSF, and the IJT against each other for much of
Pakistan’s history. While the IJT still exists as a force attempting to regulate social life
on many of the country’s campuses, and while ethnic student organizations like the
BSO  and  the  PkSF  remain  active  and  visible  (in  no  small  part  due  to  the  ongoing
repression taking place in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa as the state cracks
down on militancy and ethno-national sentiment), organizations like the PYW and the
ISF are largely bereft of any ideological identity. As a mechanism for the distribution of
patronage,  the  PYW  is  an  essentially  apolitical  body  divorced  from  any  actual
engagement  with  politics  and  while  the  ISF  was  borne  out  of  populist  appeals  for
change, it and its parent party defy ideological categorization, with their actual actions
reflecting the emptiness of the rhetoric that guides them. The DSA is an important
exception to this role, but its limited size and scale restricts the impact it has on the
political landscape.
38 In this sense, it may be fair to suggest that student bodies like the PYW and ISF are
simply artefacts of the space in which they exist; while surveys show that young people
in Pakistan have relatively high levels of political awareness, they remain disinclined to
actually  participate  in  politics,  particularly  when  it  is  of  the  contentious  variety
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(Lall 2014).  This  is  what  arguably  creates  the  space  in  which  ideologically  barren
organizations like the PYW and ISF can fill the void left by a previous generation of
student unions. Matters are not, of course, helped by the continuing existence of a ban
on student politics that has disembedded universities and colleges from their social
context. Where students in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and even 1980s received a political
education through the elections and campaigns fought by rival  student groups,  the
generation that has now come of age lacks that kind of political training and is likely to
remain disconnected from more substantive political engagement in the years ahead. 
39 The  hollowing  out  of  student  politics  in  this  fashion  has  been  accompanied  by  a
paradoxical  explosion  of  apparent  political  engagement  on  the  internet  and  social
media. While this is still a relatively new area of scholarly inquiry, preliminary research
on the link between social  media and political  participation in Pakistan shows that
younger people are more likely to be influenced by, and participate in, politics online
(Javaid 2017). Yet, as even a cursory examination of the online mediascape would show,
the  internet  and  social  media  in  Pakistan  are  characterized  by  the  existence  of
increasingly partisan echo chambers in which rhetoric, disinformation, and superficial
involvement take the place  of  actual  political  work.  As  argued by Jodi  Dean (2009),
contemporary  “communicative  capitalism” has  resulted  in  forms  of  political
engagement that fetishize opinion and contribution over debate, argument, and facts,
with the simple act of participation being valued over the content and meaning of any
contribution  that  an  individual  might  make.  This  perhaps captures  the  nature  of
student politics on the internet in Pakistan, whereby the strikes, protests, and forms of
direct  action  that  characterized  an  older  model  of  movements  have  come  to  be
replaced by clicks, tweets, and likes that arguably have little impact on the real world.
Perhaps the best illustration of this comes from how, every day, partisans of the PTI
and PML-N take to Twitter to “trend” hashtags castigating each other, engaging in tens
of thousands of online interactions that are notable for how little activity they seem to
generate on campuses and in the streets of Pakistan. 
40 Contemporary student politics in Pakistan also takes place in a context where the state
has  gradually  but  inexorably  clamped  down  on  dissent  and  alternative  viewpoints.
While  Pakistan’s  transition  to  democracy  in  2008  opened  the  possibility  of  the
emergence of a more democratic, participatory, and accountable politics, subsequent
events  have shown such hopes to  be premature.  In addition to allegedly abducting
bloggers, journalists, and other critical voices, the state in Pakistan has also attacked
campuses themselves; in 2015, for example, an event scheduled to be held at LUMS
discussing missing people in Balochistan was cancelled following pressure applied to
the  university  administration  by  the  country’s  security  services,  even  as  faculty
associated with the event were vilified in the media.  Similarly,  faculty at  the same
university  who were  suspected  of  harboring  sympathies  for  the  Pashtoon Tahaffuz
Movement, a Pashtun group protesting the brutality of the military during its anti-
militancy campaigns in Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, received phone calls and threatening
messages  from  members  of  Pakistan’s  intelligence  services.  In  2016  and  2017,  one
lecturer  associated  with  the  DSA  was  forced  out  of  both  Punjab  University  and
Government College for his alleged anti-state activities,  and was even picked up by
intelligence  operatives  and  held  for  several  hours  after  a  night-time  raid  on  his
residence in 2018. All these instances, and there are more, demonstrate a clear desire
on the part of the state to silence dissenting voices on university campuses, and to stifle
academic  freedom  in  the  name  of  national  security.  In  conclusion,  therefore,  the
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trajectory likely to be taken by Pakistan’s student politics in the future is likely to see
an  entrenchment  of  the  processes  described  above;  the  emergence  of  mainstream
student  organizations  bereft  of  ideology  and  hamstrung  by  the  logic  of  electoral
competition coexisting with smaller, increasingly endangered bodies struggling to at
least continue an older tradition of progressive politics.
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NOTES
1. As discussed below, the ban on student politics in Pakistan was introduced by the Zia-ul-Haq
regime to blunt the radical potential of student movements. Except for a brief period from 1988
to  1993,  the  ban  on  student  politics  has  remained  in  place,  with  its  chief  effect  being  the
elimination of formal student unions connected to political parties or engaged in other forms of
political activity. The one exception to this has been the IJT, whose ideological affinity with the
Zia regime led to it being excluded from the ban, and “underground” student organizations—
often  ethnic—that  challenge  the  state.  Additionally,  while  older  student  unions  and
organizations continued to exist on paper (briefly being resuscitated from 1988-1993), the limits
imposed on their activities—such as bans on rallies, protests, and electoral campaigning on and
off campus—have gradually led to their obsolescence.
2. Examples include the Democratic Students Federations (DSF), the Peoples Students Federation
(PSF) and the Muslim Students Federation (MSF); all of which were aligned with political parties
prior to the ban on student unions imposed in 1993, and all of which are now either defunct or
marginal. 
3. The MSF’s decision to support the anti-Ayub movement was prompted in part by extant splits
within the Muslim League that came to a head in the 1965 elections in which Ayub and his
Convention Muslim League competed against Fatima Jinnah’s Councilor Muslim League. The IJT,
like the Jamaat-i-Islami, opposed the regime over its supposedly secular orientation.
4. An example of this can be seen in how local government laws passed in all four of Pakistan’s
provinces between 2012 and 2014 now make it extremely difficult for local politicians elected
from rival parties to receive development funding and facilitate service delivery without the
consent of the party in power at the provincial level. In the context of Pakistan patron-client
politics, this sends a signal to voters showing that votes for candidates belonging to parties not in
power at the provincial level are essentially wasted, inducing voters to instead select politicians
who will be more likely to deliver on promises of service delivery due to their alignment with the
ruling  party. See  Javid (2019).  A  new,  less  exclusionary  local  government  law was  passed  in
Punjab by the new PTI government in 2019 but had not been implemented when this article was
written.
5. The defeat of the PML-N in the 2018 general elections arguably demonstrates the limits to the
ability of incumbent parties to tilt the electoral landscape in their favor. 
6. The “populist” label attached to the PTI is derived from its approach to politics; emphasizing
its  status  as  a  party working outside of  traditional  politics  and appealing directly  to  masses
disaffected by establishment “elites,” the PTI has styled itself  as a party articulating popular
discontent with the political status quo. This is perhaps best demonstrated by its emphasis on
holding past rulers accountable and its pledges to radically transform Pakistan for the better—
without necessarily providing concrete proposals for doing so. See Mulla (2017).
7. Allegations of this sort clouded the 2018 elections, when organizations like the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan and the European Union’s Election Observation Monitors concurred that
the PML-N and other parties had suffered at the hands of pre-poll rigging engineered by the
military establishment and designed to propel the PTI to power. 
8. These insights into the factional conflict within the PTI, and the effect it has had on student
politics,  have been gleaned from interviews with PTI  leaders  and activists  conducted by the
author from 2014-2016.
9. The linkages between the DSA and AWP are arguably derived from how the organizations
share some members. In particular, some of the DSA’s most prominent activists and members
were or are part of the AWP. 
10. Despite this, the PSC was able to successfully hold a large rally, called the Student Solidarity
March, in Lahore on November 29 2019. The participants of this march were mostly drawn from
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public sector universities and while the demands made during the event primarily focused on the
revival of student unions and other campus-related issues, space was also given to articulating
broader political concerns related to, for example, the grievances of Pakistan’s ethnic minorities.
The march was also notable for the explicitly left-wing rhetoric and slogans that were on display.
While the long-term effects of the march remain to be seen,  the state’s  reaction has been a
mixture  of  accommodation  and  repressions,  with  promises  to  restore  student  unions  being
accompanied by the persecution and imprisonment of key faculty and student organizers.
ABSTRACTS
Despite the over three decades of repression in Pakistan under the regimes of General Zia-ul-Haq
and General Musharraf Student, student politics began its revival with the emergence of student-
led activist groups during the anti-Musharraf movement of 2007. While formal student “unions”
remain banned in the country,  student and “youth” collectives aligned with various political
parties  have  started  to  play  an  increasingly  visible  and  vocal  role  in  everyday  politics  and
mobilization.  This paper seeks to contrast  three of  the main student organizations currently
operating in Punjab, namely the PML-N Youth Wing (PYW), the PTI’s Insaf Student Federation
(ISF), and the left-wing Democratic Students Alliance (DSA). By focusing on the broader social
and political  context,  characterized by  state  repression and systematic  efforts  to  undermine
student  politics,  in  which  these  organizations  operate,  this  paper  argues  that  efforts  by
mainstream political parties to cultivate support amongst young people today reinforce patterns
of  political  engagement  and  contestation  that  perpetuate  the  depoliticization  of  Pakistan’s
students and further entrench the country’s framework of centralized patronage politics. This is
particularly  true  for  the  PYW,  whose  approach  works  to  incorporate  students  within  the
workings of its parent party, and the ISF, whose populist appeals have, over time, given way to a
pragmatic politics bearing considerable resemblance to that of the PYW. The exception here is
the DSA, an avowedly progressive and radical organization that remains committed to activism,
but whose impact is limited by the constraints imposed by the wider political framework. 
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